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Neuroscience has well established that human vision divides into the central and
peripheral fields of view. Central vision extends from the point of gaze (where we
are looking) out to about 5◦ of visual angle (the width of one’s fist at arm’s length),
while peripheral vision is the vast remainder of the visual field. These visual fields
project to the parvo and magno ganglion cells, which process distinctly different
types of information from the world around us and project that information to the
ventral and dorsal visual streams, respectively. Building on the dorsal/ventral stream
dichotomy, we can further distinguish between focal processing of central vision, and
ambient processing of peripheral vision. Thus, our visual processing of and attention
to objects and scenes depends on how and where these stimuli fall on the retina.
The built environment is no exception to these dependencies, specifically in terms
of how focal object perception and ambient spatial perception create different types
of experiences we have with built environments. We argue that these foundational
mechanisms of the eye and the visual stream are limiting parameters of architectural
experience. We hypothesize that people experience architecture in two basic ways
based on these visual limitations; by intellectually assessing architecture consciously
through focal object processing and assessing architecture in terms of atmosphere
through pre-conscious ambient spatial processing. Furthermore, these separate ways
of processing architectural stimuli operate in parallel throughout the visual perceptual
system. Thus, a more comprehensive understanding of architecture must take into
account that built environments are stimuli that are treated differently by focal and
ambient vision, which enable intellectual analysis of architectural experience versus the
experience of architectural atmosphere, respectively. We offer this theoretical model to
help advance a more precise understanding of the experience of architecture, which
can be tested through future experimentation. (298 words)
Keywords: focal attention, ambient processing, intellectual attention, atmospheric awareness, central visual field,
peripheral visual field, architectural experience
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INTRODUCTION
Our hypothesis is that the visual experience of architecture is
divided into two types based on the mechanisms of the eye and
brain, which strongly affect our visual awareness and experience
within architecture; see Figure 1. The first type of experience
hypothesized is our intellectual attention to architecture (i.e.,
focally attending to particular aspects of the architecture) which
yields descriptions of the foveated architectural details. The other
type of experience is the ambient atmosphere of architecture (i.e.,
ambiently processing the overall mood of the space) which yields
emotional responses to the architectural space. If our hypothesis
is correct, then architecture allows for two different responses
to the same architectural design based on its location in the
visual field. However, because ambient processing is often outside
of conscious awareness, the problem is that our understanding
of peripheral visual processing as an essential feature of the
architectural experience is underdeveloped.
It is important to note that our hypotheses rely on a model
of a divided visual system, namely central and peripheral visual
fields on through to the dorsal and ventral stream of vision
(for reviews, see; Wilson et al., 1990; Previc, 1998; Strasburger
et al., 2011; Whitney and Levi, 2011; Loschky et al., 2017).
However, we do not claim that the human visual system is
reductive to a strict dichotomy without crossover. Nevertheless,
the general nature of a divided visual system discussed in our
model is based on a large body of research that is mostly
unchallenged and helps explain a great deal about visual sensation
and perception. We will provide a necessarily very brief overview
of the neurophysiological structures that support our model of
a divided visual system and also the deployment of attention
and awareness within the model (for more detailed coverage
of the visual system, see Siegelbaum and Hudspeth, 2000, ch.
25–27; Palmer, 1999; Frisby and Stone, 2010). Finally, to bridge
to a larger audience, including interested architects and others
interested in architecture, we have provided a more descriptive
review of the visual system to establish a broader foundation for
those not familiar with the general model of the visual system,
attention and awareness.
The Retina as a Visual Field
Light passes through the lens allowing it to project onto the
back wall of the eye called the retina. The retina has a network
of about 100 million photoreceptors are divided into two types;
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of hypotheses. Image shows the divided nature of visual perception and the overlay of architectural experience associated along each
division of vision (i.e., the central visual field/focal vision associated with intellectual architectural experience and the peripheral visual field / ambient vision associated
with atmospheric awareness of architecture). Image courtesy of Kevin Rooney.
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cones and rods. There are two important issues regarding cones
that impact the argument we are making regarding the visual
experience of architecture. The first issue is that the distribution
of cones is highly concentrated at the center of vision, the fovea
(see Figure 2). The density of cones is highest in the fovea, and
drops off exponentially with increasing distance from it. Given
the high density of cones in the central visual field, visual details
(encoded by higher spatial frequencies) are best seen with central
vision (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988).
This concentration allows for higher acuity in both form
and color in and around the fovea, called central vision, which
encompasses approximately the central 5◦ radius from the center
of the fovea. Central vision predominates our conscious vision,
and contains what we consider ourselves to be looking at. Beyond
5◦ of visual eccentricity, which is referred to as peripheral vision,
cone density quickly decreases and levels off for the remainder of
our entire visual field. The peripheral visual field predominates
our pre-conscious vision from which we come to know our visual
place in the world (Leibowitz and Post, 1982; Previc, 1998).
The second major issue is that ganglion cells, which send
information from the retina to the brain, pool information from
cones differentially between central and peripheral vision. In
peripheral vision, a single magno ganglion cell (M cell) will
typically connect to many cone receptors. This convergence
reduces visual resolution through aggregation. On the other
hand, M cells are larger and have thicker myelin sheaths, and thus
have higher processing speeds. The M cells are therefore better at
conveying information useful in detecting motion, which plays
an important role in spatial perception. Conversely, in central
vision, a single parvo ganglion cell (P cell) typically connects
to a single cone receptor. This lack of convergence produces
higher visual resolution of detail. On the other hand, P cells
are smaller, with thinner myelin sheaths, and thus have lower
processing speeds compared to M cells. P cells are therefore
better at conveying information useful for detecting differences in
color and form, which are very important for clearly identifying
objects, but worse at detecting motion. The M and P cells transfer
their output to the subcortical structure of the lateral geniculate
nucleus (LGN), which further amplifies the differences between
central and peripheral vision. The LGN then passes its output to
the primary visual cortex (aka, V1) at the back of the brain, where
there are many more cells devoted to central vision (the central
5◦ radius of vision), which is known as cortical magnification of
fovea.
Beyond V1, information is separated along the dorsal and
ventral visual streams. The ventral stream is generally understood
to process what things are (Mishkin et al., 1983) and our
conscious perception of objects and their colors and shapes
(Goodale and Milner, 1992). The dorsal stream is generally
understood to process where things are (Mishkin et al., 1983) and
enables us to interact with things and our spatial environment
(e.g., manipulating objects, navigation, etc.) (Goodale and Milner,
1992). For simplicity, and consistent with common usage, we
will call the ventral stream the “what pathway” and the dorsal
stream the “where pathway” (Mishkin et al., 1983). Importantly,
the transformations of visual information from the retina to
V1 are passed along to the what and where pathways, which
show biases towards central and peripheral vision, respectively.
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of cones by retinal eccentricity. The density of cone photoreceptors is shown to drop off exponentially with distance from the center of
vision (0 degrees from the fovea). This results in the loss of visual resolution with increasing distance from the fovea. The upper image drawn from data digitized from
Curcio et al. (1990, Figures 6a,c) and averaged over nasal and temporal directions (with the gap at the blind spot ignored). Cone density given in # cells/degrees
2 × 1000. Degrees estimated from mm using 0.288 deg/mm from Drasdo and Fowler (1974). Lower micrographs from Curcio et al. (1990, Figures 2, 3). All Curcio
et al. images reproduced with the permission of John Wiley and Sons.
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The central visual field greatly supports the processes underlying
the conscious perception of objects in the what pathway. For
example, the lateral occipital area (LOC), which is in the what
pathway and is greatly involved in object recognition, has a
strong central vision bias (Grill-Spector et al., 2001; Larsson and
Heeger, 2006). The peripheral visual field greatly supports the
processing of spatial relations, actions on objects, and navigation
of the environment in the where pathway. For example, area V6,
which is in the dorsal stream, and processes motion information
used to navigate (known as optic flow), exclusively processes
information from the visual periphery (Pitzalis et al., 2010, 2013).
Nevertheless, there is a visual area in the what pathway that has a
strong peripheral vision bias, namely the Parahippocampal Place
Area (PPA), which responds to places more strongly than to
objects, people, or faces (Malach et al., 2002; Arcaro et al., 2009;
Nasr et al., 2011). Thus, even in this case, peripheral vision is
associated with processing the big picture of the environment,
rather than objects. Conversely, areas of the parietal cortex in
the where pathway are strongly involved in grasping things with
the hands (Goodale and Milner, 1992), which crucially involves
central vision–we look at things before grasping them, to guide
fine hand movements. Thus, even in this case, central vision
is associated with processing details and objects. These latter
examples show that rather than there being a perfect division of
central vision to the what pathway, and peripheral vision to the
where pathway, central vision is devoted to detailed perception of
objects and their forms, colors and shapes, and peripheral vision
is devoted to coarse perception of our environment, our place in
it, and movement through it.
The above discussion of the anatomical and functional
specializations of central and peripheral vision, from the retina
to the what and where pathways, lays the foundation for
understanding the different roles of central and peripheral
vision. Those functional distinctions map on quite well to what
are called the focal and ambient modes of vision (Leibowitz
and Post, 1982). In a nutshell, the focal mode involves the
use of central vision to scrutinize objects, whether distant
or near, and our hands as we interact with them (Leibowitz
and Post, 1982; Previc, 1998). To those previously proposed
functions, we would add that focal mode generally concerns
things we are paying attention to because we are looking
at them. The ambient mode involves the use of our entire
visual field, which is primarily in peripheral vision, in order to
maintain our balance, and navigate through our environment
(Leibowitz and Post, 1982; Previc, 1998). To those previously
proposed functions, we would add that the ambient mode also
lets us roughly know what our surroundings are (i.e., scene
gist), and allows the brain to decide (usually unconsciously)
what we should pay attention to next. We will argue in the
remainder of our paper that the focal and ambient modes
are particularly important for our experience and appreciation
of architecture. We will argue that a built environment can
be perceived in central vision, in the focal mode, as an
object (or collection of objects), or in peripheral vision, in
the ambient mode, as a space to be in or move through.
Furthermore, we will argue that our level of conscious awareness,
and intellectual engagement with architecture is primarily
experienced through central vision in the focal mode. Conversely,
we will argue that our gut reactions to a built environment,
and our experience (often unconscious) of its atmosphere, are
primarily perceived through peripheral vision in the ambient
mode.
SIMPLE OBJECTS AND SIMPLE SCENES
In this section, we review how the two fields of vision analyze
and perceive stimuli in the world in order to show which features
are important to which type of architectural stimulus. First, we
will review object perception and its greater dependence on the
focal mode of processing through central vision in the what
pathway. Then we will discuss scene perception and with its
greater dependency on the ambient mode of visual processing
through peripheral vision in the where pathway.
What is the difference between objects and scenes? For the
sake of this section, objects will refer to those things being seen
as individual, or countable as a single unit in-and-of-themselves
when looked at; a coffee cup for example. Scenes, on the other
hand, are the visual perception of a place we are looking onto; a
beach for example. For the most part, we will argue that objects,
like cups, are best recognized when seen in the central visual field,
whereas scenes, like beaches, are best recognized when seen in the
peripheral visual field.
Object Perception
At the outset of discussing what an object is and how it is
perceived, consider the example of Jan van Goyen’s painting,
View of the Rhine near Hochelten (1653), shown in Figure 3.
In the painting, we see many objects; several different types of
boats, a couple of tents, and a number of people. This leads to an
interesting question, how do we see objects in paintings, or in the
real world? In the previous section, we discussed how the what
pathway, which is heavily involved in object recognition, makes
great use of the central visual field, which has higher resolution
than peripheral vision. This higher resolution contains higher
spatial frequencies, which are useful for perceiving the edges of
a form, which in turn are critically important for recognizing
objects (Biederman, 1987). Thus, paintings work because they
exploit the way our visual system operates. For recognizing
objects, paintings, and even more so line drawings, provide
the high spatial frequencies necessary for seeing edges, that the
ventral visual stream uses to recognize objects such as boats, tents,
and people.
Irving Biederman presents a theory of how we recognize
objects in the world in his classic model called Recognition by
Components (RBC). Biederman’s (1987) RBC theory argues that
object recognition critically depends on the edges and vertices of
an object. Specifically, he argues that “T”, “Y” and “↑” vertices,
formed by edge contrasts, provide the critical information needed
to determine the fundamental shapes that make up an object, as
shown in the middle column of images in Figure 4.
In order to clearly see such edge distinctions to recognize an
object, we must look at it, which involves pointing our fovea
(central vision) at the object. It is much more difficult to recognize
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 326
fpsyg-08-00326 March 17, 2017 Time: 19:28 # 5
Rooney et al. Focal and Ambient Processing of Built Environments
FIGURE 3 | Jan van Goyen’s view of the Rhine near Hochelten (1653). The painting is composed of painted objects which depict a river scene. Of most
interest is the blackbird flying near the lower center of the painting. The first author (KKR) notes that when seeing it in person, by staring at the blackbird, the scene
takes on a better illusion of depth. http://ww2.hdnux.com/photos/17/12/72/3976885/3/628x471.jpg.
objects in our peripheral visual field, because vision there is lower
resolution, and becomes increasingly so with greater eccentricity.
As noted earlier, this is due to the increasingly aggregated retinal
processing by the M ganglion cells (Wilkinson et al., 2016), thus
making peripheral vision much worse than central vision for
recognizing objects (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988; Strasburger
et al., 2011; Boucart et al., 2016). Biederman’s theory explains how
our ability to see the finer details of edges and their vertices allows
us to recognize what the object is that we are looking at.
In addition, there is a further difficulty in recognizing objects
in peripheral vision, which is caused by what is known as
crowding (Bouma, 1970; Pelli and Tillman, 2008; Strasburger
et al., 2011; Whitney and Levi, 2011). That is, it becomes
difficult to recognize objects in peripheral vision if there are
flanking objects near the target object (the one you are trying to
recognize). More specifically, if the distance between a flanking
object and the target object is less than half the distance of the
target object to the center of the fovea, the target object will
likely suffer crowding, a pattern of results known as Bouma’s law
(Bouma, 1970). Furthermore, while most research on crowding
has used simple stimuli (e.g., letters or Gabor patches), a
recent study has shown that crowding also occurs for objects
in real-world scenes (actually, computer-generated architectural
models of scenes) (Coy et al., 2014).
Based on the above, there is an abundant research showing
that object recognition is worse in peripheral vision than central
vision (Boucart et al., 2016; Ehinger and Rosenholtz, 2016; for
review, see Strasburger et al., 2011). Interestingly, not only is
object recognition degraded in the visual periphery, but so too
is memory for what is seen with peripheral vision (Geringswald
et al., 2016), and this seems to be due to peripheral vision
also having worse spatial coherence (i.e., degraded structure),
which is consistent with theories of crowding in peripheral
vision (Velisavljevic´ and Elder, 2008). Furthermore, when an
object seems odd in its surroundings, namely it is semantically
inconsistent, like a printer sitting on a stove, when viewed with
our peripheral vision it does not immediately grab our attention
(Võ and Henderson, 2011). This suggests the peripheral visual
system is poor at detecting that objects are inconsistent within
the rest of the scene they are in; see Figure 5. Instead, objects in
the periphery of a scene may provide more global characteristics
of that scene rather than specifics (Eberhardt et al., 2016; Ehinger
and Rosenholtz, 2016). In sum, there is considerable evidence that
we are best able to consciously understand an object when we
look at it (fixate it, or foveate it) with our central vision.
Window vs. Scotoma Conditions
Another way to explore the roles of central and peripheral vision
is through using so-called window and scotoma conditions.
Imagine an experiment in which we can block out either your
central visual field, which we will call the scotoma condition,
or your peripheral visual field, which we will call the window
condition. Window and scotoma conditions are useful in dividing
visual input between central and peripheral vision. As shown
in Figure 6, an example window condition would be a circular
region showing the central 5◦ radius of vision, and replacing
everything outside that central window with neutral gray, thus
only allowing you to see what is in your central visual field.
Conversely, the inverse of the window is the scotoma condition,
which replaces everything in the central 5◦ radius of vision with
neutral gray (the scotoma), but shows everything outside that.
Thus, the scotoma condition only allows you to see what is in
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FIGURE 4 | Biederman’s RBC images. Example of five stimulus objects in
the experiment on the perception of degraded objects. (The left column
shows the original versions. The middle column shows the recoverable
versions. The contours have been deleted in regions where they can be
replaced through collinearity or smooth curvature. The right column shows the
non-recoverable versions. The contours have been deleted at regions of
concavity so that collinearity or smooth curvature of the segments bridges the
concavity. In addition, vertices have been altered, for example, from Ys to Ls,
and misleading symmetry and parallelism have been introduced) (Biederman,
1987). Image reproduced with the permission of American Psychological
Association.
your peripheral visual field (Larson and Loschky, 2009; Larson
et al., 2014). If, under the scotoma condition, you tried looking at
a cup on the table you would find it nearly impossible to figure
out whether it was a cup of coffee, tea, or hot chocolate. This is
the real-life problem faced by people aﬄicted by central scotomas
caused by age-related macular degradation (a retinal disease of
the fovea). If that blindness was reversed by being in the window
condition, you would have a lot less trouble distinguishing what
was in the cup, but you have problems interacting with the cup,
such as reaching for it, because you would be blinded to the rest
of the scene in your visual periphery. This is the problem faced
by those aﬄicted by glaucoma and retinitis pigmentosa (retinal
diseases of the visual periphery). Studies of the roles of central
and peripheral vision on scene perception have frequently used
such experimental window and scotoma conditions.
FIGURE 5 | Võ and Henderson’s (2011) study. Consistent and inconsistent
objects within a kitchen scene. The printer went without detection when
viewed in the peripheral visual field. Image reproduced with the permission of
Springer International Publishing AG.
Scene Perception
If, instead of wanting to recognize and inspect an object, we
wanted to understand the place, or scene, we are located in,
we will need to use our peripheral vision. Returning to Jan
van Goyen’s painting of the Rhein, we may easily say, even
in the absence of its title, that it is a river scene, which we
can call its scene “gist.” Interestingly, if we saw this painting
in the scotoma condition, namely without central vision, our
sense of it being a river scene would likely remain unchanged.
Larson and Loschky’s (2009) scene gist study, which utilized
window and scotoma conditions, they found that the accuracy
of scene gist identification with a 5◦ radius Scotoma was no
worse than when seeing the entire scene. Conversely, scene gist
identification with a 5◦ radius Window was considerably worse
than seeing the entire scene. Together these findings suggested
that peripheral vision was more important for understanding
what a scene is than central vision. In a more recent study,
Loschky et al. (2015) used similar methods with panoramic
views of scenes (180◦ horizontally × 40◦ vertically), and found
similar results for 5◦ radius Window and Scotoma conditions.
Other research has shown that peripheral vision is also very
useful for identifying the location of a scene (Eberhardt et al.,
2016).
The above experiments suggest that the peripheral visual field
provides most of the important information for recognizing
what a scene is, namely its gist, and where the scene is located.
Furthermore, it seems likely that this dominance of peripheral
vision for recognizing scenes is due in part to the fact that our
peripheral visual field is so huge (thus full of information), but
also due to the ways in which this information is processed by
the brain. The features most important to scene recognition are
the same features the M ganglion cells are best at processing in
the peripheral visual field. The aggregate nature of information
along this pathway amplifies the visibility of larger contrasts
and motion (perceived or real) resulting in a bias toward lower
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FIGURE 6 | Window/Scotoma conditions. Window condition shown on left, while Scotoma condition is shown on right (Larson et al., 2014). Image reproduced
with the permission of American Psychological Association.
spatial frequencies (blurry blobs), which is one of the main
features accounting for the perception of a scene. Peripheral
vision is limited to processing lower spatial frequencies, and
configurations of low spatial frequency blobs are very useful in
recognizing scene gist (Schyns and Oliva, 1994). Thus, the work
described above suggests that peripheral vision plays a critically
important role in perceiving what scenes are and where they
are due the amount of visible area in a scene and the analysis
of low spatial frequency configurations (i.e., blobby layouts).
This is consistent with findings that the brain area known as
the PPA, which is strongly involved in recognizing the gist of
scenes (Walther et al., 2009), shows a strong peripheral vision bias
(Arcaro et al., 2009; Baldassano et al., 2016).
AWARENESS AND ATTENTION
Based on what we know about visual processing from the retina
through the what and where pathways, the division of the visual
field between central and peripheral vision suggests a distinction
between perception of stimuli in the world in terms of objects
versus scenes. But what is meant by the word perception? Our
discussion so far has concerned how visual information is filtered
and divided, but has not addressed how we come to be aware
of that information. If I look at Goyen’s painting showing a
river scene, and my eyes fixate the boats, tents, and people, then
can we say that I must surely be consciously aware of all those
things? How about walking along in a similar scene in the real
world, and looking at (fixating) similar objects? The answers to
those simple questions are quite complex, because awareness is
also not a simple singular process. Awareness too has its own
divisions of focal and ambient processing which interact with
the mechanisms of the eye either consciously or pre-consciously
(Bánréti-Fuchs, 1967; Leibowitz and Post, 1982; Merikle et al.,
2001; Horrey and Wickens, 2004). In this final section prior to
integrating architecture into the conversation, we will describe
the nature of awareness and attentional allocation and we will
give some important everyday examples of how awareness is
achieved.
Focal and Ambient Processing and
Awareness
How does awareness operate when we walk, drive, or, for
that matter, when we stand? In Leibowitz and Post’s work on
ambient processing, they described how even the act of standing
utilizes our visual processing of the world (1982). According
to Leibowitz and Post (1982), when we are standing, our
visual processing of features in the world connects with other
senses (e.g., the vestibular and kinesthetic senses) to enable us
to maintain our balance and our position among the objects
surrounding us. They describe the ambient mode of vision as
pre-conscious and dependent on the “coordination of motor
activity with the visual, vestibular, auditory and somatosensory
systems, particularly, kinesthesis” (Leibowitz and Post, 1982,
p. 344). In other words, the ambient mode is the coordination
of our senses, including vision, to aid in determining our
place in the world rather than our conscious analysis of
it.
The ambient mode of vision is concerned with earth-fixed
space, and spatial orientation and postural control in locomotion
(Horrey and Wickens, 2004). It encompasses 180◦ of frontal
vision and is dominantly influenced by the lower visual field,
due to using the ground-based optic flow (e.g., what you see in
the classic Windows “star field” screensaver) for walking. Visual
ambient processing accesses information from great distances,
relies on earth-fixed coordinate systems, and arm, leg, and head
movements are the primary movements it guides. Important
cues are the horizon, linear perspective, and optic flow. For
navigating through an environment, fine detailed information is
often less important than its global structure, and so peripheral
vision becomes very important (Turano et al., 2005; Franchak
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and Adolph, 2010; Barton et al., 2014; Ehinger and Rosenholtz,
2016). The ambient mode of vision is typically not processed
consciously and is possible even with low levels of luminance and
decreased image quality such as low spatial frequencies (blurry
blobs).
When walking, we use both central and peripheral vision, but
much of the visual processing needed can be handled by ambient
processing of peripheral vision. For walking, central vision is
mostly used for determining the location of one’s goal. Thus,
when walking, people normally look straight ahead or fixate
their goal to navigate to it (Turano et al., 2001). However, when
patients with peripheral vision loss walk, they frequently fixate
the ground in front of them or walls to gather information on
the layout of the scene, to situate themselves within their visual
environment—people with normal vision use their peripheral
vision for those functions. Thus, while walking through a space,
people use their peripheral vision to create a coherent mental
representation of the spatial relationships between objects in
a space (Fortenbaugh et al., 2007, 2008). Specifically, having
either a real or simulated peripheral vision loss (e.g., a moving
scotoma) produces faulty mental representations of a space
(producing misremembered locations of objects). Furthermore,
when walking, normally sighted people primarily use their
peripheral vision to alter their course or their gait to avoid
obstacles—people rarely fixate such obstacles before walking over
or onto them (only 20–30% of the time) (Marigold et al., 2007;
Franchak and Adolph, 2010). An extreme example in the real
world is the fact that it is possible to walk, albeit more slowly
and hesitatingly, while texting (Plummer et al., 2015)—note that
while this is dangerous, because it almost surely increases the
likelihood of collisions, it illustrates the use of ambient vision in
walking.
Similarly, when considering the everyday act of driving,
studies have shown that a driver can maintain their lane position
while looking at and paying close attention to information on the
car dashboard (Summala et al., 1996; Horrey and Wickens, 2004).
Conversely, ambient vision was not sufficient to detect hazardous,
or unexpected situations, such as a lead vehicle suddenly braking
(Summala et al., 1998; Lamble et al., 1999; Horrey et al., 2006).
So, as we are walking or driving and daydreaming, it is our
pre-conscious ambient visual perception which keeps us on our
path or on the road, but unfortunately does not help much in
seeing the child between two signs about to dart out in front of
us.
To see a child about to enter the road, we often must utilize our
central visual field and attend to them with what Leibowitz and
Post (1982) refer to as focal attention. Horrey and Wickens (2004)
suggest that focal attention operates within the central 20◦–30◦
of the upper visual field. Focal attention also spans from 0.2 m
(8 inches) to great distances, relies on eye movements (saccades)
as the primary motor system, and is centered in the retinotopic
coordinate system (i.e., what is seen at any given moment, and its
position on the retina). It is also highly represented in conscious
awareness and is adversely affected by low levels of luminance,
decreased image quality, and lower spatial frequencies. Thus,
focal attention plays a critical role in our conscious awareness of
objects in our surroundings.
Attentional Allocation and Deployment
Visual attention has been studied in great depth over the
past 50 years (for reviews, see Pashler, 1998; Carrasco, 2011;
Chun et al., 2011). There are two basic manners in which
we visually attend to the world. We can attend to something
overtly by looking at it (i.e., fixating it with our eyes; e.g.,
looking to the left after hearing glass break) or we can
attend to something covertly without actually looking at it
(e.g., fixating our target in war ball but attending to their
teammate to their right without moving our eyes). Importantly,
paying attention to something, even covertly (i.e., without
fixating it), can improve your perception of it, allowing you
to perceive more details in it (Carrasco, 2011), and allowing
it to enter your conscious awareness (Kuhn and Findlay,
2009).
There are also different ways that our brains filter out the
overwhelming amount of visual information contained in the
world by attending to some manageably small amount of it at a
given moment, which are known as spatial, feature-based, and
object-based attentional selection. Spatial attentional selection
can be understood as where in our visual field we attend to at
a given moment. For example, when searching for your car in
a parking lot, at a given moment, you might attend only to the
location you are fixating, or you might broaden your attention to
encompass your entire visual field, including all of the parking lot
you can see at that moment. Feature-based attentional selection
involves focusing attention on certain features over others, such
as if your car is red, then not attending to all of the cars in
the parking lot, but instead only attending to the red ones.
Object-based attentional selection involves focusing attention on
entire objects, whatever their shape, size, color, or location in your
visual field; for example, when you finally find your car, attending
only to it, rather than some particular location containing three
red cars, including yours and two others. You can intentionally
deploy your attention, known as endogenous deployment, for
example looking both ways before crossing a street. Or your
attention can be captured by an unexpected stimulus, such as a
blinking light, known as exogenous deployment. Additionally,
as suggested above, when discussing spatial selective attention,
you can focus your attention narrowly, like a spotlight (Posner,
1980) or spread it out broadly, like a zoom lens (Eriksen and
Yeh, 1985). The effect of either focusing or spreading out your
attention is similar to the costs and benefits of central and
peripheral vision. The more spread out your attention is, the
more things you can consciously perceive, but the fewer details
you are able to perceive of each thing. The more narrowly
focused you attend, the better you can see what you are attending
to, but the more blinded you become to the things you are
ignoring (Ikeda and Takeuchi, 1975; Williams, 1989; Ringer et al.,
2016).
Importantly, the benefits and costs of visual attention on
perception are subject to the hard-visual limitations set by the eye
and brain in the central and peripheral visual fields. Thus, if you
attend to something covertly in your visual periphery, you will
perceive it better than if you had ignored it, but you may still find
it difficult to determine what it is, for all of the reasons we have
discussed earlier (i.e., low resolution and crowding in peripheral
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vision, due to the physiology of the retina, and visual processing
by the brain).
Attention and awareness are also important to the distinction
between focal and ambient processing. For example, we
mentioned earlier that drivers can maintain their lane position
even when their attention is focused below the dashboard on
their radio (Summala et al., 1996). This suggests that ambient
processing of peripheral vision, which has been argued to be pre-
conscious (Previc, 1998), is unaffected by focusing attention, and
awareness, in central vision. However, later research by Horrey
et al. (2006) has shown that this is not completely true. They
found that drivers’ lane-keeping performance using peripheral
vision was somewhat degraded both as more time was spent
looking at a visual display below the dashboard, and also as that
focal vision task became more difficult. This suggests that some
attentional resources are shared between focal vision and ambient
vision. This is consistent with the idea discussed earlier that there
is a trade-off between focusing and spreading our attention. As
we more strongly focus our attention in central vision for greater
detail, we trade-off our ambient awareness of our surroundings
(Ringer et al., 2016).
There are further complications in understanding the
relationship between attention, looking at things, and being
aware of them. Recall that overt attention is where you are
looking at, but covert attention is when you are attending to
something you are not looking at. The fact that covertly attending
to things we are not looking at may help to explain, then, why
we can fail to notice (i.e., be unaware of) something that we are
actually looking straight at (Memmert, 2006). Similarly, research
has shown that when something in the visual environment
involuntarily captures a viewer’s attention, and they automatically
fixate it, their brain may not consciously register having looked at
it at all, as shown by both subjective measures of awareness and
by their brain waves (i.e., a lack of the “error-related positivity”
event related potential) (Belopolsky et al., 2008). Thus, even when
a person fixates something, which by definition uses their central
vision, it is not always sufficient for their becoming aware of that
thing.
So, what can we say about visual awareness, attention, and
central and peripheral vision? Overt attention is defined as
where we are fixating, which in turn defines central vision, and
attention is often necessary for conscious awareness of objects.
Thus, attention, awareness, and central vision go hand in hand.
Conversely, peripheral vision is often ignored, and thus we are
often not consciously aware of the contents of our peripheral
visual field, though we use it to navigate through the world. Thus,
the focal mode of vision is associated with conscious perception
of things in central vision, whereas the ambient mode of vision
depends largely on peripheral vision, often without attention, and
is largely preconscious.
Nevertheless, the above summary turns out to be somewhat
oversimplified. Fixating an object does not guarantee that you
are currently attending to it, or consciously aware of it. This is
in part because we can expand our attention and awareness into
our peripheral visual field. Furthermore, failing to attend to our
peripheral visual field can even degrade ambient vision functions
such as navigation.
All of these relationships shape our visual experience and
awareness of architecture, which is largely determined by the
nature and functions of the visual system; an architecture we
will suggest is primarily experienced ambiently through our
peripheral vision.
DIVIDING THE HOUSE OF
ARCHITECTURE
Our review of visual processing, attention and awareness is
intended to divide the consideration of architecture into what
we experience through our focal attention to built environments
versus our ambient awareness of them. For example, when
looking at an image of Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome, it is
possible to come to some judgment about the appearance of the
architecture; see Figure 7. However, when we are placed inside
the space of Saint Peter’s, our surrounding visual environment,
processed ambiently, will likely impact our posture, the way
we walk through the environment, and our mood, whether
consciously or not, in ways that simply looking at a photograph
could not achieve. The difference between the above two
examples is that the image of Saint Peter’s Basilica relies on
our conscious attention as we scan the photograph with our
central vision in attempts to find something in the architecture.
Conversely, the example of being surrounded in the space relies
on using the ambient mode to process our environment. This
simple exercise reveals our argument that with architecture there
are two distinctly different sets of visual processes which can
occur; one through our focal attention which is often prompted
by an object-based search for and evaluation of something, and
one that ambiently processes the atmosphere of the space which
surrounds us. Unfortunately, a lack of consideration of ambient
processing of architecture has caused a great deal of trouble in our
contemporary understanding of architecture. This is because we
have become all too accustomed to regarding architecture only
in terms of its focal features with less regard to its atmosphere
perceived through ambient processing of its composition of
space.
Having considered research on object and scene perception
and focal and ambient processing, what makes architecture
unique among the vast array of visual stimuli? The first argument
for architecture’s uniqueness is that it can be experienced by all
of the above-described forms of visual processing and attention
unlike smaller objects like cups. As shown in Figure 8, we see a
building in the distance as an object, but enter it as a scene for
human endeavors. We cast our focal attention on to details of
the building when asked our opinion of the architecture, only
later to find our ambient awareness consumed by its interior
space. The second argument for the uniqueness of architecture
is that it is created by humans, and thus architectural objects and
spaces are imbued with intention by our perceptual and cognitive
systems, unlike beach scenes which are generally absent of human
intentions.
The first argument for architecture’s uniqueness brings to
light a fascinating problem in the perception and experience
of architecture. Our visual system cannot process and become
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FIGURE 7 | The Interior of Saint Peters’ Basilica in Rome. Maderno’s nave, looking toward the chancel. Photo by Jean-Christophe Benoist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Peter’s_Basilica#/media/File:Vatican-StPierre-Intérieur1.jpg.
aware of architecture at both levels at once, but it can only
do so over time and through exploration (Böhme, 2006;
Sauchelli, 2012). As discussed previously regarding focusing
attention versus zooming attention out, we trade off visual
awareness of the built environment depending on our physical
relationship to it (approaching it, versus inhabiting it), and
based on how we choose to attend to it (focusing on a
detail, or zooming out to perceive it as a space). Interestingly,
under this claim, architecture engenders at least two different
forms of awareness; one that is intellectual (e.g., focally
applying our attention to particular aspects of the architecture)
and one that is atmospheric (e.g., ambiently processing
the overall mood of the space, either consciously or pre-
consciously).
Focal Attention and Intellectual Analysis
of Architecture
The intellectual form of focal attention of architecture is probably
the most common way people think about architecture when
they consider it. When we flip through a book about great
architecture, or see a documentary about the works of Frank
Lloyd Wright (e.g., see Figure 9), or maybe we even happen
inside a space such as the Thorncrown Chapel by Fay Jones,
we may find ourselves curious about the work (see Figure 10).
When we think of architecture, we may find ourselves asking
basic questions like; what makes it great, how did the designer
achieve this, or even why does anyone like this building? This line
of questioning prompts a conscious, intellectual attention of the
building in which our line of questioning is directed toward an
object. This type of engagement is what aesthetic philosopher
Roger Scruton (1979) claims as an intellectual form of judgment
about a work of architecture. It is intellectual because it is based
on our conscious analysis of built features and the particular type
of pleasure we find in them. We argue that Scruton’s description
of the intellectual process of architectural engagement is best
supported by the mechanisms of central vision, the what pathway,
and focal attention.
Scruton’s construct of intellect can be connected to specific
widely studied cognitive functions, such as problem solving
(e.g., trying to answer the question, “What makes this building
great?”), and judgment and decision making (e.g., making a
judgment of what is aesthetically pleasing), which involve both
logical and heuristic thinking. Thus, Scruton’s argument may
create a bridge between what aesthetic philosophers claim about
architecture and what psychological scientists refer to as higher
order cognition. Note that although the higher-order cognitive
processes involved, namely problem solving and judgment and
decision making are certainly not considered part of visual
perception, the argument is that they are subserved by central
vision. This would be similar to the way in which reading
comprehension is not a visual process, but the act of reading
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FIGURE 8 | Le Corbusier’s Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut in Ronchamp. Exterior view (A) and interior view (B). The Chapel can be seen as both object
foveated from a distance and spatial atmosphere ambiently processed. Exterior image by Wladyslaw: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/de/2/29/
Notre_Dame_du_Haut(ws).jpg. Interior image by Wladyslaw: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Notre_Dame_du_Haut_Innenraum_mit_Altar(ws).jpg.
involves the use of central vision (i.e., reading is generally only
possible by using the fovea to fixate each content word in a
text–reading is not something people generally do in peripheral
vision).
At the very first level of such intellectually driven attention
to architecture, we argue that it is very common to direct our
attention to a built environment using our central visual field
when attempting to judge it. For example, trying to answer
the question, what makes this building great, typically prompts
our looking around at it to find the answer, rather like looking
for Waldo in a “Where’s Waldo?” image. In doing so, we are
primarily utilizing our central visual field and rely heavily on
the what pathway to distinguish architectural forms and their
intersections. In such an intellectual analysis of architecture, the
details of the building then come to the forefront of our attention,
and this inhibits our overall awareness of the space in favor of
what we are looking at with our central vision.
It is possible, of course, that such intellectual processes as
Scruton describes may involve peripheral vision, though we think
this is unlikely. For example, Scruton argues that the columns
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FIGURE 9 | Frank Lloyd Wright’s Falling Water. Photo by Somach; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fallingwater_-_by_Frank_Lloyd_Wright.jpg.
at Palazzo Massimi alle Colonne can be perceived as having
various rhythms, which can be aesthetically and intellectually
appreciated as having architectural value (1979). If the idea that
such intellectual engagement with architecture primarily involves
central vision is correct, then the aesthetic experience of judging
the various rhythms of the same columns should involve making
numerous saccades and eye fixations between the columns—a
testable hypothesis.
This type of object-based attention of architecture not only
occurs when we analyze the great works of architecture, but
also extends into everyday life as when we walk into a friend’s
house for the first time. We may scan their home in hopes of
finding some new piece of information about who they are as
if the floor mat at the front door provides greater information
about the quality of our friend’s hospitality. Similarly, when we
are in the physician’s waiting room, we may look around the
space to understand how we will be treated. Environments matter
to us, and by scanning them with our central visual field, we
allow ourselves to analyze their identity more closely in the
same way we might analyze the cup to see if it is full of coffee
or tea. The problem with solely relying on this object-based,
intellectual attention to our built environment is that it does
not tell the complete story of the architecture as it might with
the cup of coffee, and in doing so we have come too quick in
giving judgment to features which are merely supportive of the
larger ambient affect architecture can have on us. The cup of
coffee can be known best by our focal attention of it, but the
essence of architecture must be found in our full exploration of
it as an environment, and it is here where we can distinguish the
uniqueness of built environments from other objects, such as the
cup of coffee, by the way in which we visually consume them.
To illustrate these ideas, consider Figure 11, which shows
Carlo Scarpa’s Brion Cemetery in San Vito d’Altivole, Italy. If we
consider it aesthetically, we find that the details of the design
present a highly repetitive ziggurat pattern. The pattern runs
through many of the spaces and provides the visual features
used by Biederman’s RBC model for object recognition, namely
edges and vertices. Such edges, vertices, and corners seem likely
to capture our focal attention and eye fixations (Krieger et al.,
2000; Mital et al., 2011). If we are judging this built environment
while trying to answer the question, “What makes this building
great?” we may find ourselves drawn into an endless play of edges,
captivating our intellectual attention. However, doing so could
mislead us into thinking that such details are the foundation
of its aesthetic essence. In our assessment, Scarpa, knowingly
or not, overloads our attention with the ever presence of edges
and vertices. An interesting question is whether we can gain
a better feeling of the architectural periphery by exposing our
peripheral vision, and thus ambient processing while following
the ziggurat pattern. This may in fact be possible, given what has
been shown about people’s ability to use their ambient processing
to maintain their lane position while driving, even when they
are fixating, and focusing their attention on, a control panel
below their windshield (Summala et al., 1996). If so, then the
ziggurat pattern, by guiding attention and eye movements, may
indirectly benefit ambient processing of the entire architectural
space. In this sense, the ziggurats might dynamically operate
similarly to Jan van Goyen’s placement of the blackbird near the
lower center of his painting, as shown in Figure 4 – namely,
the blackbird serves as an ideal viewing position to sense the
space of the painting. An alternative possibility, however, is that
by increasing the number of foveal details to process in an
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FIGURE 10 | Interior of Fay Jone’s Thorncrown Chapel in Eureka Springs, Arkansas. Photo taken by Bobak Ha’Eri: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Thorncrown_Chapel#/media/File:09-02-06-ThorncrownChapel1.jpg.
architectural environment, one decreases the viewer’s attention
to the spatial environment as a whole, thus lessening their
awareness of it (e.g., Ringer et al., 2016). These alternative
hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive if ambient processing
occurs without even broadly spread attention in one’s visual
periphery (as suggested by the results of Summala et al., 1996).
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to empirically test these
hypotheses, by measuring attention and ambient processing of
an architectural space as a function of the number of interesting
details in it available to capture one’s focal attention. Note that
regardless of the outcome of such investigations, the current
theoretical framework provides theoretical value by asking new
and important questions for architecture.
Ambient Awareness and the Atmosphere
of Architecture
The ambient form of awareness with architecture is probably
the least common way people consider architecture, and often
people must be trained to become consciously aware of the
features that they typically process only pre-consciously. In
regards to architecture, ambient processing through peripheral
vision is probably the vast majority of the way in which we
experience built environments in our everyday lives. Going
back to Horrey and Wickens (2004) analysis of ambient
vision and environmental cues, we can draw an analogy
between driving a car and walking through a building in
order to analyze the separate information that focal and
ambient modes depend on. When it comes to naturally
experiencing architecture, it seems likely that many visual tasks
involved with built environments do not require direct focal
attention, although there are some important exceptions such
as keeping track of one’s goal as one navigates through a
built environment; opening doors and windows. Often, though,
focal attention is directed toward other goals within the built
environment, such as speaking with people (e.g., attention to
facial expressions), object interaction (e.g., reaching for a cup
to drink), or even introspection (e.g., thinking/daydreaming).
Returning to Scruton’s (1979) argument that the appreciation
of architecture involves an intellectual process, this suggests
that we must inspect architecture with the focal mode of
vision to assess its quality. However, a more naturalistic
experience of architecture through the ambient mode suggests
a non-intellectual analysis because the ambient mode does
not require focal attention, and likely operates pre-consciously
(Previc, 1998).
Previc’s (1998) model of space perception includes ambient
processing for maintaining spatial orientation and postural
control, and describes the extension of our body into our
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FIGURE 11 | Exterior of Carlo Scarpa’s Brion Cemetery in San Vito d’Altivole, Italy. The intense working of ziggurat details are present throughout the Brion
Cemetery as seen within the entryway and along the wall and ground. The effect often leads the eye in a chasing game of quick saccades. Photo courtesy of Sandra
Rooney.
environment. It relies on stability of the ambient environment
as predominately perceived through peripheral vision and
preconsciously. The Pantheon in Rome is a good example as the
lack of vertical cues and the visual tendency to look up toward
the oculus in the ceiling reduces our ambient perception of spatial
orientation and postural control (e.g., Leibowitz and Post, 1982)
destabilizing our posture which may cause us to become more
aware of the space. Under Previc’s model, our body movement
adjusts our perception of the world and the built environment,
processed ambiently, adjusts our body movement.
In the above descriptions, ambient awareness of architecture
refers both to the ambient processes discussed by Horrey and
Wickens (2004) and a particular range of aesthetic feelings
we have regarding an architectural environment, which we are
occasionally made aware of when experiencing architecture as an
atmosphere.
A good example of such architectural atmosphere is provided
by consideration of Fay Jones’ Thorncrown Chapel in Eureka
Springs, Arkansas (Figure 10). In looking at it, we may find
ourselves intrigued by the detail of joinery and the negative
intersections at the trusses, but we argue that this intellectual,
object-based attention is not the reason for the ambient feeling
of atmosphere we might gain by being in the space. The quality
of light, the height and width of the space, the movement of trees
seen peripherally through the expanse of windows, the rhythmic
pattern of frames cascading forward all aid in producing the
essential feeling we gain from the atmosphere in the chapel.
Only through these features, accessible through the peripheral
visual field, processed by the where pathway, and with ambient
vision, do we fully experience the atmosphere of the space.
Our intellectual attention only provides the individual details
of evidence that our friend is indeed welcoming us into their
home which we experience ambiently as a space. This is much the
same way that Fay Jones welcomes us to his own atmosphere of
aspired transcendence with his design of the Thorncrown Chapel
(Foley, 2010). Fittingly, Fay Jones himself was quoted as asking
his daughter “Do you feel it?” as they entered the space together
(Foley, 2010).
This raises two critical questions for our theory: (1) What
exactly is the atmosphere of a built environment, and (2)
Is architectural atmosphere amenable to scientific inquiry?
As noted by Tröndle and Tschacher (2012), in everyday
conversation we commonly talk about the atmosphere of a
place using words such as bright, cheerful, dreary, or gloomy,
but atmosphere is a relatively new theoretical construct in
the aesthetics of architecture (Böhme, 2006) and geography
(Anderson, 2009) with philosophical consideration dating back
to August Schmarsow’s idea of spatial essence (Schmarsow, 1873).
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Böhme (2006, p. 402) defines atmosphere as “the character of
the space in which we find ourselves” and “an affective tendency
by which our mood is attuned to the nature of a space...” In
simpler terms “by entering a room, one may adopt a certain
mood” (Tröndle and Tschacher, 2012, p. 106). Furthermore, the
atmosphere of a space is influenced not only by the structure of
the built environment (i.e., the bricks and mortar), but also by the
light in it, which “. . .give[s] a space a distinctive character. Light
that fills a room can make that room serene, exhilarating, gloomy,
festive, or eerie” (Böhme, 2006, p. 405). Thus, atmosphere, as
discussed both in the aesthetics of architecture, and in everyday
conversation, is the overall emotional impression, or mood, a
person feels in a built environment. Importantly, recent work
by Tröndle and Tschacher (2012) shows promising results in
terms of empirically measuring the effects of manipulating the
atmosphere of a room.
For much of the 20th century, most experimental
psychologists considered emotion to be outside of the realm of
scientific investigation, on the assumption that it could only be
approached qualitatively or intuitively. However, over the last
several decades it has become abundantly clear that emotions
are amenable to scientific investigation and explanation.
Importantly, specific emotions (e.g., disgust, fear, happiness,
sadness, anger, surprise) can be reliably evoked in different
people by particular stimuli such as film clips (Hewig et al., 2005;
Coan and Allen, 2007). Just as importantly, those emotions can
be measured reliably with both subjective measures (e.g., ratings
scales) and objective measures (e.g., facial expressions, heart rate,
galvanic skin response, EEG, or fMRI) (Dimberg et al., 2000;
Coan and Allen, 2007; Lee and Hsieh, 2014; Saarimäki et al.,
2016). Concerning atmosphere, moods are distinguishable from
emotions by being longer lasting (e.g., from several minutes to
several hours), being less intensely felt (often experienced as a
background feeling), and by having causes that are not always
easily identifiable by the person feeling them (Mitchell and
Phillips, 2007). Finally, a large body of research has shown that
emotions (and moods) have distinct dimensions of valence (i.e.,
positive to negative emotions) and arousal (low to high), and
the more recently proposed dimension of dominance (low to
high) (Koelstra et al., 2012). For example, a joyful mood would
have high positive valence, high arousal, and high dominance.
Conversely, a subdued dark mood would have a moderately
negative valence, relatively low arousal, and low dominance.
Thus, to the extent that architectural environments affect people’s
moods, that should constitute the environment’s atmosphere,
and should be amenable to scientific study.
We propose that the atmosphere, or mood, of a built
environment is particularly processed by ambient vision
from the visual periphery. As noted above, aestheticians
(e.g., Böhme, 2006; Anderson, 2009) have argued that an
architectural atmosphere is the mood evoked by perception
of its space. Concerning space perception, we have reviewed
evidence showing that peripheral vision is important for holistic
processing of the “gist” of scenes (Larson and Loschky, 2009),
identifying the locations of scenes (Eberhardt et al., 2016), and
creating an accurate mental representation of a space when
walking through it (Fortenbaugh et al., 2007, 2008). We have also
reviewed evidence showing how peripheral vision is important
for ambient vision functions such as avoiding obstacles while
walking, and maintain one’s posture and balance in a space. All
of this indicates that ambient processing of peripheral vision
is important for holistic processing of the space of a built
environment.
This leads us to the next question, which is whether ambient
processing of a space through peripheral vision allows people to
perceive the mood of that space, and research suggests that the
answer is yes. This conclusion comes from numerous studies
that have investigated the processing of emotional scenes in
peripheral vision. Typically, such emotional scenes come from
the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2008),
which includes many photographs of scenes varying in both
valence (positive vs. negative) and arousal (low vs. high), for
example, a man and a woman drinking coffee (neutral valence,
low arousal), a man attacking a woman (negative valence, high
arousal), or a man and a woman making love (positive valence,
high arousal). These studies have shown that emotional scenes
in the visual periphery can involuntarily capture attention and
eye movements (Nummenmaa et al., 2010; McSorley and van
Reekum, 2013; but see Acunzo and Henderson, 2011), even when
viewers are instructed not to look at them (Kissler and Keil,
2008). Furthermore, these effects of emotional scenes presented
in peripheral vision can occur even when viewers are unable to
report details of the emotional content (e.g., that a man attacked
a woman) (Calvo, 2006; Calvo et al., 2008; Rigoulot et al., 2008;
McSorley and van Reekum, 2013). Importantly, however, such
emotional processing of peripheral vision is degraded when a
person’s attentional resources are focused in central vision (Calvo
and Lang, 2005), which suggests that peripheral visual processing
of emotional content requires some allocation of attention. In
sum, while peripheral vision is often insufficient to identify
emotionally charged objects or entities in a scene, it does allow
processing of a holistic emotional gist of a scene, which can
involuntarily draw people’s attention to those emotional stimuli.
We therefore hypothesize that the emotional gist of a scene
is like the scene’s mood, and thus that peripheral vision can
play an important role in perceiving the atmosphere of a built
environment.
The above discussion leaves two important unanswered
questions for our theory. First, using only peripheral vision,
can viewers recognize the mood, or atmosphere of a built
environment when it is not determined by specific emotionally
charged content (e.g., a man attacking a woman), but instead
is determined by architecturally relevant variables (e.g., the
architect’s use of light, space, and materials)? We believe that it
should be possible to do so, but this is an empirical question
needing to be tested. Second, if the answer to the preceding
question is “yes,” then is it also possible for viewers to perceive
architectural mood, or atmosphere, without paying attention to
their peripheral vision? The results of Calvo and Lang (2005)
described above suggest the answer is “no,” but work on ambient
vision has shown that some activities using purely peripheral
vision (e.g., walking while texting, or maintaining one’s lane
position while driving and looking at a display below the
dashboard) are at least moderately preserved even when viewers
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strongly focus their attention on the fovea (Summala et al., 1996;




It is important that we eventually test the above proposed
theoretical distinction between foveated intellectual attention
of designed details versus peripheral ambient atmosphere
experience of architectural spaces. Here we sketch out two
possible ways to test these ideas which could be achieved by
recruiting lesion patients that are blinded along the peripheral
visual field/dorsal stream or the central visual field/ventral
stream, or recruiting visually healthy participants and applying
window and scotoma blinding via eye tracking.
Some examples of research regarding lesion patients include
optic ataxia patients with dorsal lesions who showed the inability
to distinguish locations of objects (Bálint and Harvey, 1995)
as well as ventral lesions resulting in visual form agnosia with
patients showing the inability to recognize objects (Benson
and Greenberg, 1969). Our interest in these studies is focused
on the inability of these patients to experience visual stimuli
presented in the visual field associated with the blindness
caused by the lesion. In the case of optic ataxia, these patients
should encounter problems associated with perceiving the
composition of architectural spaces and perceiving the mood of
the space, given the proposed hypothesis that the composition
of architectural spaces is critical to providing an atmosphere
that affects the mood of someone viewing it. On the other
hand, patients suffering from visual form agnosia should have
great difficulty apprehending the intellectual appreciation of
details presented foveally, but may still be affected by the
surrounding space peripherally via the atmosphere created,
compositionally, by the architect. One caveat is that even though
a patient has a lesion, neural networks are known to reroute
in compensation for lesion damage and may provide partially
regained perception, even if unconsciously (O’Regan and Noë,
2001). Thus, follow-up research should also present window /
scotoma conditions to both lesion patients and normally sighted
viewers.
With either lesion patients and/or window/scotoma
conditions, we could experimentally test the validity of our
proposed distinction by showing viewers architectural images
while varying the visual field available to them (e.g., central
vision through a window condition and peripheral vision
through a scotoma condition) and measuring an array of
dependent variables that assess viewers’ intellectual responses
(e.g., concerning architectural details and qualities) versus
mood-related responses (e.g., arousal and valence). Importantly,
the architectural images used should vary in terms of their details
(which are best seen foveally) and their spaces (which are best
seen peripherally), and in terms of their judged architectural
qualities (as determined ahead of time by a group of architectural
experts) and their mood (as determined ahead of time by a group
of architecturally naïve viewers). For example, the images should
contain recognizable architectural “objects” (e.g., details such
as column types: ionic vs. corinthian; intersection of materials:
wood detail meeting a metal detail) and have reliably identifiable
moods (e.g., Figure 12: Alcatraz prison: oppressive, gloomy,
depressing; Figure 10: Thorncrown Chapel: calm, meditative,
transcendental).
Then, one could show three groups of viewers the same set
of architectural images in the window or scotoma conditions
(e.g., a scotoma group, a window group, and a whole image
control group). Importantly, the image sets should be derived
from panoramic photos and presented on a large screen (e.g.,
180◦ diameter) to fully engage the peripheral visual field during
presentation. However, in the window condition, only a circular
region in the central 10◦ diameter (out to 5◦ eccentricity) of
the panoramic images would be shown, with the remainder
of the 180◦ wide image would be replaced with even gray.
The scotoma condition would be the inverse of the window
condition – the central 10◦ circular region would be filled with
neutral gray, but the remainder of the 180◦ wide image would be
visible.
Images would be briefly flashed for the duration of roughly
one eye fixation (e.g., 330 ms), in order to engage only
central or peripheral vision. Such methods would be very
similar to those in a recent set of experiments by Loschky
et al. (2015), though those were not concerned with the
perception of architecture, but rather the rapid categorization
of scenes. Then, in order to assess intellectual versus mood-
related responses, think-aloud protocols would be a good initial
source of data. For these, one could simply ask viewers to
describe anything that comes to mind from the image they
just saw. Transcripts of their think-aloud protocols could then
be analyzed in terms of the types of words used, or concepts
described. A key question would be whether architectural
details and qualities would be more frequently described in
the window condition, and whether moods or spatial terms
would be more frequently described in the scotoma condition.
To assess viewers’ moods as affected by the architectural
views, we could also use both subjective emotion rating scales
and objective biometric measures (Coan and Allen, 2007).
Biometric measures could include galvanic skin response, heart
rate variability, and breathing rate variability as measures of
arousal, and EMG facial readings (Dimberg et al., 2000) or
EEG connectivity as measures of valence (Lee and Hsieh,
2014).
In the window condition, in which only central vision is
available, we would expect that think-aloud protocols would
include mention of important targeted details within the
architectural image, such as the detailed intersection of wooden
trusses with the metal bracket at the Thorncrown Chapel
designed by Fay Jones. Alternately, in the scotoma condition,
which only allows peripheral vision, we would expect that
verbal protocols would be more likely to include descriptions
of important atmospheric qualities of the architecture, which
are readily available through peripheral processing, such as the
transcendental mood that the Thorncrown Chapel architectural
space was designed to evoke. In terms of subjective ratings
of emotions and biometric measures of arousal and valence,
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FIGURE 12 | Interior of Alcatraz Prison, Alcatraz Island, CA, USA. This built environment evokes an atmosphere describable in almost exclusively negatively
valenced terms. Photo taken by Krystian Olszanski (CC BY 2.0). https://www.flickr.com/photos/krystiano/4637560951/in/photostream.
we would expect that they would be more influenced by the
scotoma condition, based on the use of peripheral vision, than
by the window condition, based on the use of central vision.
Thus, it will be of great interest to determine whether the
control condition, in which viewers see each entire image, shows
a discrepancy between the contents of the verbal protocols
and the mood measures. Given that central vision tends to
be what we pay attention to, thus leading to an intellectual
attention of the details that are being foveated, viewers’ verbal
protocols might be more similar to the window (central
vision) condition, while the mood measures might be more
similar to the scotoma (peripheral vision) condition. Another
interesting possibility would be to produce hybrid images that
combine a) architectural details from one building in the central
window region with b) the architectural space from another
building shown in the periphery. A key question would be
whether the think-aloud protocols and mood measures would
be more influenced by the central and peripheral regions,
respectively.
Additionally, we suggest that images be grouped into similar
mood signatures and presented in blocks over time. For example,
calm images would be shown for an extended time period (each
at 330 ms for a 10 min session), then tense images (each at
330 ms for another 10 min session). The use of 10 min intervals
for each set of images per mood signature is much like Kreibig
et al. (2007), who studied cardiovascular, electrodermal, and
respiratory response patterns to fear and sadness inducing films.
In their study, Kreibig et al. (2007) used 10 min per film to test
either fear or sadness.
To study the effects of attention on perception of atmosphere,
we could use dual task methods, such as having participants
respond to a visual task in central vision, such as on their
cell phone, versus simply having participants respond to the
architectural images.
Finally, because ambient processing is critically important for
navigating in our environment, other studies should investigate
the role of peripheral vision in perceiving the mood of an
architectural space while navigating through it. This could be
done using the window, scotoma, and control conditions in a
helmet-based virtual reality, and with the same array of subjective
and objective measures of ambient mood and focal intellectual
attention.
CONCLUSION
In summary, most of the time we attend to and are aware
of the things we are looking at in central vision. This applies
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to architecture as well and often occurs when we look at
architecture to make some type of intellectual judgment about
its appearance. Conversely, in our everyday experience of
architecture, we usually do not pay attention to it – architecture
is usually treated as background. Nevertheless, the background
space, processed by our peripheral vision in some sort of pre-
conscious state (Previc, 1998), may affect our mood (e.g., we
may feel closed in or depressed because the building appears
dreary). However, in some cases of outstanding architecture, our
attention will be grabbed by the entirety of a built space, such
as the interior of the Pantheon. In those cases, our attention
can expand outward from central vision to encompass all or
most of our visual field, which is largely in peripheral vision. At
such moments, we may become aware of the space we inhabit,
achieving a conscious ambient awareness of the atmosphere
created by the architecture.
Given the mechanisms of vision from the retina to the
dorsal and ventral streams, the experience of architecture
simultaneously operates within the central and peripheral
visual fields through focal and ambient modes of vision. Due
to this fluid state, architecture stands as a unique type of
environmental stimulus which can transition between object
and scene perception along a cognitive spectrum of visual and
attentive responses unlike most other stimuli. Our specific claim
is that there is an architecture which we intellectually assess
through our focal attention of whatever we look at (foveate)
and an architecture which we are affected by through the
atmosphere felt through ambient processing of our surrounding
environment. Importantly, these separate forms of architectural
processing operate in parallel throughout the visual perceptual
system. Thus, a complete understanding of architecture must
consider it as a stimulus whose perception is dependent on
the relationship between our focal and ambient processing,
each of which plays a unique role in our visual experience
of architecture. Our aim is to balance the understanding of
architectural experience by bringing attention to the essential
ambient processing of peripheral vision, which is often more
difficult to describe and often neglected, but which we believe has
a profound effect on our experience of built environments.
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